A qui tam lawsuit where taxpayers tried to intervene in a declaratory judgment lawsuit. Court held that the OMA was not violated and they "found no facts or legal argument raised by Taxpayer that were insufficiently presented by the City in its pleadings, motions, and accompanying materials."

Shall is mandatory. Executive session for the purpose of discussing the purchase or appraisal of real property shall be limited to members of the public body, its attorney, and the immediate staff. The OMA is construed liberally in favor of the public as designed for the publics benefit.

When an agenda does not provide notice of intent to consider a contract, it "constitutes a 'willful,' 'conscious' violation of the OMA 'by those who know, or should know the requirements of the Act.'"

Notice providing for discussion of "employment, hiring, resignation" is insufficient and deceptively vague when the city actually gave a large bonus to employee. This willful violation voids any action that was taken at that meeting under the OMA.

It is not a violation of the OMA for less than a majority of a public body to meet - because, without a majority, there can be no "meeting" under the Act and, therefore, no violation.

State judiciary is expressly excluded from the OMA - which includes the Professional Responsibility Commission and the Bar in the context of professional discipline.

Meetings and discussions between parties and administrative staff, who had no authority to make a decision, does not constitute a violation of the OMA when those discussions were merely suggested recommendations given to the Board and the underlying meeting was not subject to the OMA.

Held that executive sessions are a matter of more than local municipality concern, and a city charter that did not allow for executive sessions must yield to state statute (OMA § 307) that allowed for executive sessions under certain conditions. NOTE: This overruled 1980 OK AG 218.

An executive session is allowed to discuss the non-reemployment of a school employee as the definition of "employment" is broad enough to include non-reemployment for lack of sufficient funds.

Plaintiffs failed to show improper notice or agenda for a meeting. Even if they did these things, there was no argument that the improper notice would have made the passed ordinance unlawful. However, OMA § 313 does state, "Any action taken in willful violation of this act shall be invalid."

Where copies of a contract to be considered at a meeting were not provided to the public until 2 days before the meeting, the ORA nor the OMA were violated because the contract was not ready until that time. As long as a contract is provided as soon as it is ready, there is no violation of law.

OMA § 302 "is designed as an interpretive device for giving the act its legislatively intended meaning."

Agendas were found to be proper by the Court of Civil Appeals. This conclusion was not addressed by the Supreme Court in this case because the lawyers did not present that for review in their Petition for Certorari.

Where an employment contract was approved at a valid meeting, but the agreement to hire was at an invalid meeting, the hiring still stands. The approval of the contract was the controlling date and that meeting was lawfully conducted.

City employee was given notice of a termination hearing for her employment and she attended the hearing. Court found that the notice was still proper, even though the notice was not on any agenda or approved by the town board. The vote to issue notice was not required in this situation.